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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Woodall does not dispute Reynolds' statement of the basis for appellate jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
court assumes the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bemeau v. Martino, 223 P.3d 1128,
1130 (Utah.2009). The Court further reviews the trial court's decision for correctness without
deference to its findings. Whipple v. American Fork Irr. Co.. 910 P.2d 1218, 1220
(Utah. 1996). However, the Court should find dismissal justified when the allegations of the
complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim. Id. at 1220.
STATUTORY PROVISION OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
57-1 -22. Successor trustees - Appointment by beneficiary - Effect - Substitution of trustee
— Recording — Form.
(1) (a) The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time byfilingfor record
in the office of the county recorder of each county in which the trust property or some part
of the trust property is situated, a substitution of trustee.
(b) The new trustee shall succeed to all the power, duties, authority, and title of the
trustee named in the deed of trust and of any successor trustee.
(c) The beneficiary may, by express provision in the substitution of trustee, ratify and
confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the new trustee prior to the recording of
the substitution of trustee.
(2) The substitution shall:
(a) identify the trust deed by stating:
(i) the names of the original parties to the trust deed;
(ii) the date of recordation; and
(iii) (A) the book and page where the trust deed is recorded; or
(B) the entry number;
(b) include the legal description of the trust property;
(c) state the name and address of the new trustee; and
(d) be executed and acknowledged by all of the beneficiaries under the trust deed or
their successors in interest.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(3) (a) If not previously recorded at the time of recording a notice of default, the
successor trustee shall file for record, in the office of the county recorder of each county in
which the trust property or some part of it is situated, the substitution of trustee.
(b) A copy of the substitution of trustee shall be sent in the manner provided in
Subsection 57-1-26(2) to any:
(i) person who requests a copy of any notice of default or notice of sale under
Subsection 57-l-26(l)(a); and
(ii) person who is a party to the trust deed to whom a copy of a notice of default would
be required to be mailed by Subsection 57-1-26(3).
(4) A substitution of trustee shall be in substantially the following form:
Substitution of Trustee
(insert name and address of new trustee)
is hereby appointed successor trustee under the trust deed executed by
as trustor,
in which
is named beneficiary and
as trustee, and filed for record
(month\day\year), and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records of
County, (or filed for record
(month\day\year), with recorder's entry No.
,
County), Utah.
(Insert legal description)
Signature
•
(Certificate of Acknowledgment)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Woodall does not dispute the procedural summary of the proceedings in the trial court
set forth in Reynolds' Opening Brief. Woodall offers the following supplement to the facts
numbered as 18, 22, and 31 in Reynolds' Opening Brief.
Reynolds' Fact Number 18: The Notice of Default dated April 15,2009, and recorded
April 16,2009, specifies that Woodall is acting as Trustee under the HELOC Deed of Trust,
identifies Citibank Federal Savings Bank as the Beneficiary, declares a default in payments
by the Plaintiff, and specifies that by reason of the default, "Beneficiary has instructed the
Trustee to.cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured thereby."
Reynolds' Fact Number 22: The Notice of Trustee's Sale posted on the front door of
the real property at issued specified that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale would take place on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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September 16,2009, and further specifies that "The current beneficiary of the Trust Deed as
of the date of this notice is CITIBANK FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK."
Reynolds' Fact Number 31: The Substitution of Trustee dated October 30,2009, and
executed by Citibank Federal Savings Bank ("Citibank'1) contains the following language
above the signature of the beneficiary: 'The undersigned Beneficiary hereby ratifies and
confirms any and all actions taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the Successor Trustee prior
to the recording of the Substitution of Trustee."
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The case at bar involves the authority of a beneficiary under a deed of trust to ratify
and confirm actions taken by a substituted trustee prior to the recording of that Substitution
of Trustee in the official records of the County, granted in Utah Code 57-1-22(1 )(c). This
Court should affirm the trial court's order of dismissal and judgment in favor of Appellee
James H. Woodall ("Woodall") because Reynolds misapprehends the statutory section at
issue, and her interpretation would in essence eliminate the ratification authority from Title
57 of the Utah Code.
Reynolds9 argument that Woodall became the substituted trustee by an oral
substitution of trustee is factually wrong and rebutted by the documents she presented to the
trial court in her original and amended complaints. Utah Code 57-1-22(2) specifies the
manner in which a trustee under the original deed of trust can be substituted, including the
exact language of the substitution that parties can utilize to comply with the statute. Reynolds
attached the written substitution of trustee appointing Woodall as trustee as an exhibit to her
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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complaints, and no good faith dispute exists that the writing is executed by the beneficiary
or that it fails to set forth all of the information required by Utah Code 57-1-22(2). Instead,
Reynolds' actual dispute thus relates to the timing of a beneficiary's ratification of acts by
a substitute trustee and the scope of the authority to ratify and confirm under Utah Code 57l-22(l)(c). This does not constitute a statute of frauds issue, but an issue of interpreting the
scope of the ratification authority. Therefore, the statue of frauds argument is non sequitur.
The remainder of Reynolds' arguments represent an attempt to read the ratification
authority set forth in Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c) out of the statutory scheme governing
nonjudicial foreclosures. Reynolds essentially argues that a substitution of trustee cannot
ratify action taken prior to its recording, and that the only remedy for a beneficiary or trustee
who fails to record the substitution of trustee contemporaneous with the Notice of Default
is to re-start the nonjudicial foreclosure process. However, the authority to ratify In Utah
Code 57-l-22(l)(c) contemplates that a Substitution of Trustee was not recorded prior to
actions taken by the trustee, such as the recording of a Notice of Default or issuance of a
Notice of Trustee's Sale. If a foreclosure process became void due to the failure to serve a
signed Substitution of Trustee concurrent with the Notice of Default, it would render the
authority of the beneficiary to ratify the actions taken by a trustee moot. Neither Utah Code
57-l-22(l)(c) nor Utah decisional authority provide for this result. On this basis, the trial
court correctly dismissed Reynolds' first amended complaint without leave to amend, and
this Court should affirm that judgment on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
L

REYNOLDS5 STATUE OF FRAUDS ARGUMENT HAS NO MERIT
BECAUSE THE RECORDED SUBSTITUTION OF TRUSTEE APPOINTING
WOOD ALL SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE 57-1-22(2)
Reynolds' contention that an oral substitution of Woodall as the trustee under the

second priority deed of trust occurred contradicts the recorded Substitution of Trustee that
she attached to her amended complaint. Her complaint did not contain any allegation that
Woodall became the substituted trustee by an oral agreement only. Even if she could have
proffered that theory as a basis to further amend her complaint, it would not have constituted
a well-plead fact that the trial court had to consider as true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion because she attached the actual substitution as an exhibit to her original and first
amended complaint. As discussed herein, the recorded Substitution of Trustee complies with
the specific statutory provision governing the contents of such documents and demonstrates
compliance with the statute of frauds as a matter of law.
The Court need not refer to the general statute of frauds statute or non-foreclosure law
decisional authority to evaluate if the recorded substitution satisfies the statute of frauds
under Utah law. Instead, Utah Code 57-1 -22 sets forth the requirement of a recorded writing
signed by the beneficiary for an effective assignment. Subsection (2) specifies that a
substitution of trustee shall (a) identify the trust deed by stating: (i) the names of the original
parties to the trust deed; (ii) the date of recordation; and, (iii) (A) the book and page where
the trust deed is recorded; or (B) the entry number; (b) include the legal description of the
trust property; (c) state the name and address of the new trustee; and, (d) be executed and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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acknowledged by all of the beneficiaries under the trust deed or their successors in interest.
The substitution of trustee executed by Citibank Federal Savings Bank ("Citibank")
appointing Woodall includes all of this required information and is in a writing recorded in
the official records of Salt Lake County. Reynolds does not dispute that the Substitution
contains all of the requisite information.
Reynolds' nevertheless argues that the trial court had to ignore this writing as a matter
of law because the date of its execution, without regard to its contents. This does not
constitute a colorable argument that the Substitution of Trustee appointing Mr. Woodall
failed to comply with the Utah statute of frauds. Instead, her statute of frauds argument is
simply a variant of her legal theory that Utah law does not permit a beneficiary to ratify the
actions taken by a trustee prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee. As set forth in
the next section, this argument runs contrary to the plain language of Utah Code 57-122(1 )(c), and attempts to read the ratification authority out of the Utah Code entirely. Her
stand-alone argument that an oral substitution of trustee occurred has no factual or legal
support, meaning this Court should affirm the dismissal of the first amended complaint
without leave to amend.
II.

UTAH CODE 57-1-22 EXPRESSLY PERMITS RATIFICATION OF THE
ACTS OF A TRUSTEE BY A BENEFICIARY TAKING PLACE PRIOR TO
THE RECORDING OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF TRUSTEE, MEANING
REYNOLDS' ARGUMENTS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW
Reynolds' tortured construction of the ratification authority set forth in Utah Code 57-

l-22(l)(c) defies both norms of statutory interpretation and logic. Reynolds argues at length
that despite the "ratify and confirm" language in this subsection, a Substitution of Trustee
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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can never cause ratification of acts taken by the trustee prior to its recording. Reynolds does
not and cannot cite any legislative history or case law to support this proposition. In essence,
this would read the ratification authority out of the statute.
Reynolds grudgingly acknowledges that a Substitution of Trustee could contain a
ratification of action taken by a trustee if the date on the Substitution of Trustee is on or
before the Notice of Default and recorded at the same tine as the Notice of Default. However,
this interpretation would read a provision into 57-l-22(l)(c) that the Utah legislature did not
create. This subsection does not limit the ratification authority to acts taken prior to the
execution date of the Substitution of Trustee; as discussed below, it allows the beneficiary
to ratify and confirm any acts taken by the trustee prior to the recording of the Substitution.
A.

Reynolds' Contention that the Trial Court Failed to Consider Utah Code 57-122(3) is Erroneous and Ignores the Authority to Ratify in the Same Section

Reynolds argues at page 21 of her Opening Brief that no valid nonjudicial foreclosure
activity can ever occur without the recording of a Substitution of Trustee, citing to the
language of Utah Code 57-1-22(3) and claiming that the trial court failed to consider it.
However, Reynolds fails to acknowledge the actual findings of the trial court, and that her
rationale would eliminate the authority found earlier in that same section for a beneficiary
to ratify and confirm acts by the trustee prior to the recording of the substitution.
Subsection (3)(a) of Utah Code 57-1-22 addresses the requirement to record a
substitution of trustee at the time of recording a notice of default if the substitution has not
already been recorded. Subsection (3)(b) then addresses the requirement to sent a copy of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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substitution of trustee to specified persons. Reynolds interprets this section to mean that a
notice of default cannot be issued unless a substitution of trustee is previously or
concurrently recorded, and that failure to record the substitution makes all of the nonjudicial
foreclosure activity void.
This argument ignores the fact that the Utah Legislature has already addressed the
situation in which a trustee proceeds with nonjudicial foreclosure activity before a
Substitution of Trustee is executed and recorded. This argument is discussed in detail in
section II.B. infra. In summary, pursuant to Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c), the Beneficiary can
ratify the actions taken by a Trustee before the actual substitution of that Trustee:
(c) The beneficiary may, by express provision in the substitution of trustee,
ratify and confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the new trustee
prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee.
In granting Woodall's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the authority of
Citibank to ratify actions taken by Woodall prior to recordation of the Substitution of Trustee
included the Notice of Default, Notice of Trustee's Sale, conducting the foreclosure sale, and
recording the Trustee's Deed. Indeed, the authority to ratify contemplates that a Substitution
of Trustee was not recorded prior to actions taken by the trustee, such as the recording of a
Notice of Default or issuance of a Notice of Trustee's Sale. If a foreclosure process became
void due to the failure to serve a signed Substitution of Trustee concurrent with the Notice
of Default, it would render the authority of the beneficiary to ratify the actions taken by a
trustee, including and after the Notice of Default, moot.
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Neither Utah Code 57-1-22(1 )(c) nor Utah decisional authority provide for this result.
Indeed, while Utah Code 57-l-22(3)(b) indicates the trustee shall serve the Substitution with
the Notice of Default, the subsequent sections governing a Notice of Default - i.e., 57-1-23
and 57-1-24 - do not make service of the Substitution a prerequisite for the validity of the
Notice of Default. To find otherwise would require this Court to add statutory prerequisites
to the Utah nonjudicial foreclosure statutory scheme that it did not deem appropriate to
include. As a result, Reynolds' argument that the trial court erred in failing to consider Utah
Code 57-1-22(3) is erroneous and fails to provide a basis for reversal.
B.

Reynolds9 Interpretation of the Ratification Authority Would Require this
Court to Eliminate that Statutory Provision from Utah Code 57-1-22

Reynolds argues that the ratification authority under Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c) "is
precisely what it is, nothing more" (Reynolds' Brief at p. 22), and does not include the
authority to ratify and confirm actions taken prior to the recording of the substitution of
trustee (Reynolds' Brief at p. 23.) Reynolds further asserts in the issues of law section of her
brief that the phrase ratify and confirm under Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c) means only to "adopt
for one's own purposes". Reynolds' construction of Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c) is tortured and
nonsensical because it requires this Court to ignore the plain language of the subsection and
deprive the beneficiary of the ability to ratify and confirm.
On June 30, 2011, this Court considered the manner and scope of ratification under
Utah law in Franklin Credit Management v. Hannev.

P.3d

, 2011 WL 2567550, *8

(June 30, 2011). The Hanney court found that it "is well-established under Utah law that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

[subsequent affirmance by a principal of a contract made on his behalf by one who had at
the time neither actual nor apparent authority constitutes a ratification, which in general is
as effectual as an original authorization." Id at *8. With regard to the statute of frauds,
Hanney noted that if "the Utah statute of frauds requires that any agent executing an
agreement conveying an interest in land on behalf of his principal must be authorized in
writing.. .Where the law requires the authority to be given in writing, the ratification must
also generally be in writing." Id.
The Utah legislature created the specific remedy for a beneficiary to utilize in the
situation when a substitution of trustee is not recorded before foreclosure notices are issued
by the new trustee, and also specified the required contents of the written document. Under
Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c), the substitution of trustee can contain an express provision by the
beneficiary to ratify and confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf before the recording
of the substitution of trustee. This subsection follows subsection (l)(a), which would *
otherwise limit the authority of a successor trustee to act unless and until the recording of the
appointment with the County recorder. It also follows subsection (l)(b), which provides for
the new trustee to have all the powers of the trustee named in the deed of trust.
Therefore, the language of subsection (l)(c) of Utah Code 57-1-22 does not limit the
authority of the beneficiary to ratify actions taken by the new trustee to only those taken
between the execution of an appointment of successor trustee and its recording. Instead, it
allows an express ratification and consent by the beneficiary to action "taken on the
beneficiary's behalf by the new trustee prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee".
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The fact that the Utah legislature specified that the Substitution of Trustee document itself
can set forth the ratification authority indicates the specific intent to allow a cure of the
failure to record the substitution of trustee prior to commencing nonjudicial foreclosure
activities rather than requiring the re-initiation of the entire nonjudicial foreclosure process
in order to cure this oversight.
The Substitution of Trustee attached as Exhibit L to Reynolds' first amended
complaint contains the following language above the signature of the beneficiary: "The
undersigned Beneficiary hereby ratifies and confirms any and all actions taken on the
beneficiary's behalf by the Successor Trustee prior to the recording of the Substitution of
Trustee." Therefore, the record before the trial court established that Citibank expressly
ratified the actions taken by Woodall as a Trustee within the meaning of Title 57 of the Utah
Code. When Citibank executed the Substitution of Trustee on October 30,2009, it expressly
ratified and confirmed "any and all actions taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the Successor
Trustee prior to the recording of the Substitution of Trustee." As a result, Citibank ratified
Woodall's recording of the Notice of Default, issuance of the Notice of Trustee's Sale,
conduct of the sale on September 16,2009, and subsequent recording of the Trustee's Deed.
The trial thus appropriately granted Woodall's motion to dismiss on the ratification issue.
C.

Reynolds' Limited Construction of Ratification Authority is Contrary to the
Statutory Language because it Leaves to Act the Beneficiary can Ratify

Reynolds concedes at page 24 of her Brief that Utah Code 5 7-1 -22( 1 )(c) might permit
a beneficiary to ratify and confirm acts by a trustee done before the recording of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Substitution of Trustee if that document existed at the time the foreclosure notices were
delivered, but was simply not recorded. Under her interpretation, 57-l-22(l)(c) "applies
during the period between the execution of a written substitution of trustee and the time that
it can be recorded", and the substitution of trustee can only be recorded before or
concurrently with the Notice of Default.
Reynolds' construction of 57-1-22(c) would mean that ratification authority only
exists if the beneficiary or trustee discovers that the Substitution of Trustee was already
executed, but inadvertently not recorded before the Notice of Default. This would mean that
every Substitution of Trustee would have to contain a ratification provision for acts that have
not actually happened as of the date the substitution is executed. Further, it would eliminate
the possibility of ratification if the beneficiary for any reason failed to execute the
substitution of trustee prior to the new trustee delivering any notices.
Indeed, Reynolds' construction would render the ratification authority meaningless,
as if the substitution of trustee with the ratification provision has to be recorded with the
Notice of Default, there is no act by the trustee that can be ratified. The mailing of the Notice
of Default is not required until a maximum often days after its recording pursuant to Utah
Code 57-1-26(2). As a result, accepting Reynolds' interpretation of 57-1-22(1 )(c) would
mean there is nothing for the beneficiary to ratify as a matter of law.
This argument contradicts the plain language of the statute at issue. Subsection (1 )(c)
does not limit the authority of the beneficiary to confirm and ratify such action depending on
the date of execution of the appointment of the successor trustee. If the Utah legislature
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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intended to so limit the authority to ratify and confirm, it could have used that language in
the statute; it did not. Instead, it provides that the beneficiary could ratify and confirm any
acts taken by the substituted trustee before the substitution is recorded. Therefore, Utah Code
57-1-22(1 )(c) provides a remedy for the failure to record the Substitution of Trustee short of
re-staring the nonjudicial foreclosure process, which Reynolds' impliedly argues.
Two recent decisions issued by Federal Courts in Nevada are instructive on the
authority of a beneficiary to ratify actions taken by a trustee prior to the recording of the
notice of default and without regard to the date on the substitution document. These decisions
are particularly persuasive because Nevada's nonjudicial foreclosure statutory scheme does
not contain a similar ratification provision to Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c). In Logan v. World
Sav. Bank, FSB, the U.S. District Court rejected the theory presented by Reynolds in the
present case when the substitution of trustee was recorded after the notice of default:
However, a Substitution of Trustee wasfiledin this matter substituting NDSC
for Golden West Savings Association. Although this Substitution of Trustee
was filed after the recordation of the NOD, it does represent a clear and
unambiguous representation that either NDSC was acting on behalf of a
proper entity, either the trustee or beneficiary, or a subsequent ratification
of the actions taken by NDSC by the beneficiary, who executed the
Substitution of Trustee, with regards to the recording of the NOD. In either
event, the subsequent recordation of a Substitution of Trustee naming NDSC
as the new trustee corrects the defect in its recording, rendering the claim
under NRS 107.080 moot.
See 2011 WL 1627001, *2 (D.Nev. April 26,2011) (unpublished) (emphasis added). Another
U.S. District Court in Nevada echoed this point and specifically found that ratification under
principles of agency made the acts of a trustee who had not yet been substituted by a written
instrument valid:
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Plaintiffs allege that the beneficiaries in these cases willfully proceed to
foreclosure despite knowing that an entity that was not the trustee has filed the
notice of default. But that willfulness is called ratification, and it cures an
otherwise defective filing even where the purported agent was not in fact an
agent when it acted. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.03 (f,A person
may ratify an act if the actor acted or purported to act as an agent on the
person's behalf." (emphasis added)). A beneficiary may therefore proceed
with foreclosure based on the filing of a notice of default by a party that
purported to be its agent or trustee but was not, so long as the beneficiary
ratifies the action. "A person may ratify the act of an agent or the act of a
person who purported to be an agent but was not." Id. at § 4.03 cmt. b. A
later-executed substitution of trustee making the notice of default filer the
new trustee before proceeding to sale is practically insurmountable evidence
of ratification, and as Plaintiffs note (and in fact document in their motion),
the beneficiaries in these cases typically execute such substitutions.
See Nev. ex rel. Bates v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Svs.. 2011 WL 1582945, *5 (D.Nev.
April 25,2011) (unpublished) (emphases added). Consequently, the principle that ratification
of the actions taken by Woodall allows for authorization of nonjudicial foreclosure activities
that pre-date the recording of the Substitution of Trustee is supported even in the absence of
the express Utah statutory authority. As a result, Reynolds' contrary argument is unavailing
and fails to provide a basis for reversal of the trial court's decision.
III.

REYNOLDS' ASSERTIONS THAT THE NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
PROCESS WAS VOID IS AN ERRONEOUS STATEMENT OF UTAH LAW
APPLICABLE TO NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURES
Reynolds argued in the trial court that any action taken by Woodall was "without

authority, and void", and makes the same argument on appeal premised upon the timing of
the recording of the Substitution of Trustee. Reynolds relies on the this same argument to
claim that Reynolds could ignore the recording of the Notice of Default or delivery of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

notice of trustee's sale by Woodall. By her rationale, she could ignore these statutory notices
notwithstanding her undisputed payment default, take no action to enjoin the foreclosure sale
noticed by Woodall, and then subsequently claim entitlement to set aside the completed
nonjudicial foreclosure sale. In addition to her complete misapprehension of the ratification
authority, Reynolds' argument also ignores Utah law regarding the validity of nonjudicial
foreclosure sales in light of allegations of statutory noncompliance.
In Timm v. Dewsnup, the borrower contended that the trustee gave defective notice
of the trustee's sale, entitling her to an order setting it aside. Timm v. Dewsnup, 86 P.3d 699,
705 (Utah.2003). Specifically, she asserted that Title 57-1-26(2) required sending notice by
certified or registered mail when an address for such notice is properly recorded or is
included in the trust deed. Id. The deed of trust in that case included only a general delivery
address which did not permit delivery of notice by certified or registered mail. Id- Thus,
while the trustee technically did not comply with this mailing requirement, the parties
presented evidence at trial establishing that Mrs. Dewsnup had actual notice of the
foreclosure sale, including her filing of motion to stay the sale one month in advance of the
foreclosure and her actual attendance at the sale. Id. The Court found that "[w]hatever
irregularities Mrs. Dewsnup may allege in the technicalities of the notice requirement, they
are immaterial if she does not demonstrate that she was unable to protect her interests, or if
there were a resulting 'effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of price.'"
Id. at 706. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court in Timm v. Dewsnup affirmed the trial
court determination that notice of the foreclosure was not defective. Id.
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In ruling that the notice defect caused by the lack of certified or registered mailing
constituted an immaterial error, the Timm v. Dewsnup court cited to its earlier decision in
Concepts. Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Serv.. Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah. 1987). Concepts
explained that while Title 57 of the Utah Code sets forth strict notice requirements,
immaterial errors would not affect the sufficiency of the notice or sale:
The purpose of strict notice requirements in a nonjudicial sale of property
secured by trust deed is to inform persons with an interest in the property of
the pending sale of the property, so that they may act to protect those interests.
The objective of the notice is to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If that
objective is attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the
sufficiency of the notice or the sale made pursuant thereto.
Concepts at 1159. The Concepts court further found that the party challenging the validity
of the sale bears the burden of proof, and that defects in notice that will warrant setting aside
the sale "must be those that would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an
inadequacy of price. The remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in cases which
reach unjust extremes." Id.
Based upon her admissions in the complaint and amended complaint, as well as Timm
v. Dewsnup and Concepts, Reynolds could not state a claim to declare the Trustee's Sale
valid as a matter of law. In the trial court, Reynolds did not dispute that she had defaulted in
payments or that she received contact from more than one trustee seeking to foreclose.
Instead, she argued that she was entitled to disregard notices from Woodall because she had
not received a substitution of trustee from him. She cannot sustain an argument that bid
chilling occurred because a third party purchaser acquired the property at the foreclosure sale,
and she did not assert an inadequate price resulted from the alleged defect in the foreclosure
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process. Consequently, she cannot establish a material defect sufficient to void the
foreclosure sale pursuant to Timm v. Dewsnup and Concepts.
In addition, the defect that Reynolds argues invalidates the nonjudicial foreclosure
sale, namely the timing of the recording of the substitution of trustee, has a statutory cure that
the beneficiary satisfied in the case at issue. Specifically, Citibank ratified and confirmed that
the Notice of Default, Notice of Trustee's Sale, and sale conducted by Woodall were
authorized and approved by it. Citibank ratified and confirmed these actions in the format
provided for in Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c). The fact that the Utah legislature created a remedy
for the timing of the recording of the Substitution of Trustee makes the case at bar an even
stronger case for finding that no material error in the foreclosure process existed.
Therefore, Reynolds' bold assertion of a legally void foreclosure process does not
comport with specific Utah law on the issue. Accordingly, Reynolds did not and could not
allege that foreclosure sale at issue was invalid as matter of law under Timm v. Dewsnup and
Concepts, meaning this court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the first amended
complaint without leave to amend.
/././
/././
/././
/././
/././
/././
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IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Woodall respectfully requests that the Court affirm the

judgment of the trial dismissing Reynolds'firstamended complaint without leave to amend,
and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.
Dated:

August 11. 2011

PITE DUNCAN, LLP_-
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